Rethinking war, state formation, and system formation: A historical comparison of ancient China (659--221 BC) and early modern Europe (1495--1815 AD).

摘要

This dissertation seeks to integrate two issue areas—state formation and system formation—and juxtapose two historical systems—early modern Europe (1495–1815) and ancient China (659–221 BC). In integrating the two issue areas, theories of international relations and theories of states are used to complement each other. In juxtaposing the two historical cases, early modern Europe is used to construct a “counterfactual China” while ancient China is used to construct a “counterfactual Europe.” Although early modern Europe and ancient China reached diametrically opposite outcomes in both processes of system formation and state formation—institutionalization of checks and balances in the former and establishment of a coercive universal empire in the latter, the two historical systems in fact shared striking similarities in their formative processes.; This analysis advances the theoretical framework of the “logic of competing logics” to unify the two issue areas and two historical cases. The main argument is that heightened international competition at the onset of system formation unleashed two opposite logics which then engaged in strategic interaction or competition in the subsequent processes of system formation and state formation. The logic of balancing involved the mechanism of balance of power or resistance, and that of rising costs of expansion or administration. Theorists of international relations and state formation alike take for granted this balancing logic. However, domination-seekers could pursue a divide-and-rule strategy to overcome the balance-of-power mechanism. They could also pursue self-strengthening reforms to simultaneously improve their relative capabilities and minimize costs. Domination-seekers could further employ Machiavellian tactics to play targets off against one another and to compensate for insufficient relative capabilities. These three strategies constitute the coercive logic. This analysis argues that war should advantage the coercive logic and help it roll back the balancing logic in both system formation and state formation. This was what happened in ancient China. Early modern Europe, however, avoided the coercive trajectory as rulers rarely employed Machiavellian tactics and were very late in developing self-strengthening reforms.