Poverty, economic need, and landmine/unexploded ordnance incidents in Cambodia.

摘要

This dissertation analyzes the relationship between poverty, economic need and landmine/unexploded ordnance incidents in Cambodia. Various governmental and nongovernmental organizations combating the landmine problem focus primarily on landmine removal and mine risk education, but scant attention is paid to the underlying socioeconomic factors that precede incident occurrence. The objective of this dissertation is to determine the impact of economic conditions on the number of incidents. In this effort, I distinguish between accidents and tampering - intentional handling of ordnance - on grounds that each incident type may be driven by distinct factors.;I first employ several socioeconomic indicators of poverty to test, at the district level, the hypothesis that higher economic need leads to more landmine/UXO accidents and tampering. I find that landmine-related incidents increase with several measures of economic need: higher levels of single parenting, use of firewood for cooking, migration, population density, male-female sex-ratio, and a lack of education. I suggest that policymakers track various measures of poverty and provide relief in times of economic need in an effort to reduce future incidents.;Next, I perform a panel analysis of 26 provinces in Cambodia between 1998 and 2006 to test the hypothesis that agricultural vulnerability increases landmine/UXO incidents. I find that landmine/UXO accidents and tampering incidents decline with improved agricultural performance as measured by net rice output, supply of water, rice yields, crop diversification, floods/droughts, and nonrice agricultural production. I suggest creating a sustainable irrigation-based infrastructure, implementing high-yielding rice varieties, providing initial seed-stock supplies, and diversifying crops as policy instruments that can reduce landmine/UXO incidents.;Finally, I test the response of tampering to the price of scrap metal at the Cambodia-Thailand border. I regress the number of monthly tampering incidents on the scrap metal price level, with specific controls for month fixed effects. I find that tampering activities respond directly and more than proportionately to a change in the price of scrap metal. I suggest a simultaneous effort of metal price-fixing in conjunction with on-site ordnance payment programs as a solution to tampering; the most prevalent form of incident in Cambodia.