Cooperation versus competition: Optimal strategies for process and product innovation.

摘要

This dissertation consists of three essays that address different aspects of cooperative research in oligopolistic industries. Models of process and product innovation are developed followed by an empirical analysis of cooperative R&D activity.;Chapter two examines the private versus the social incentives for R&D cooperation in the case of asymmetric firms. The Cournot model with R&D and stochastic innovation before production yields asymmetric equilibria in the production and research stage. The main findings confirm that R&D cooperation increases welfare for most parameter values. However, welfare may be reduced if cooperation partners are very dissimilar. The study shows that the welfare results and the willingness to cooperate depend not only on the spillover parameter but also on the degree of the cost reduction and the initial cost difference between the firms. In contrast to the symmetric case, the desire of the two firms to cooperate does not coincide for a wide range of parameters.;The third chapter focuses on product innovation and develops a model that endogenizes the degree of cooperation. Two opposing forces affect firm profit in an R&D joint venture. Cooperation increases the quality of the product but it also makes the new products more similar. The increasing substitutability of the product intensifies competition in the production stage. Thus, it may not be optimal to share all of the product information. The basic model is altered to allow for a joint-selling agreement and for tariffs or transport costs. Firms are found to increase R&D cooperation if they are protected from product market competition.;The fourth chapter gives a ten-year overview over the magnitude and dispersion of cooperative R&D activity. A global database is used to illustrate the distribution of R&D agreements over time, world regions, and industries. Furthermore, the chapter examines the determinants of R&D cooperation at the industry level. It is found that industry concentration has a positive effect on R&D agreements per dollar spent on R&D. This result indicates that, as suggested in chapter three, the degree of competition plays a significant role for the level of cooperative R&D activity within an industry.