In the nineteenth century, Jacques Babinet thought there was a planet between Mercury and the Sun. He introduced ‘Vulcan’ as a name for such a planet; but, unfortunately for him, there was and is no such planet. ‘Vulcan’ is an empty name: it's a name that doesn't refer to anything. Ever since the time of Parmenides, empty names have been giving philosophers lots of headaches.; There is a longstanding dispute in the philosophy of language about what the content of a name is, where the content of an expression is what it contributes to the propositions expressed by sentences that contain it. On the one hand, direct reference theorists say that the content of a name is the object that it refers to. On the other hand, Fregeans say that the content of a name is a sense, which presents the object that the name refers to. Empty names don't refer to anything. So, on the direct reference theory, they have no content. As a result, empty names pose a host of problems for the direct reference theory. By contrast, on the Fregean theory, empty names can still have contents (provided that some senses don't present any object). As a result, empty names don't pose nearly as many problems for the Fregean theory.; The problems that empty names pose for the direct reference theory have been taken to provide reasons for rejecting that theory in favor of its Fregean rival. But it would be a mistake to reject the direct reference theory on those grounds. Why? Because, by appropriating Fregean resources, direct reference theorists can offer solutions to the problems that empty names pose. Or so I argue in this dissertation. The main lesson that emerges is that the dispute between direct reference theorists and Fregeans, properly understood, isn't a dispute about whether there are senses so much as it is a dispute about where there are senses. Both direct reference theorists and Fregeans can appeal to senses, but only Fregeans think that senses are in the propositions expressed by sentences that contain names.
展开▼
机译：在19世纪，雅克·巴比内特（Jacques Babinet）认为水星与太阳之间存在一颗行星。他介绍了“火神”作为这种星球的名字。但是，对他来说不幸的是，曾经有没有这样的星球。 “瓦肯（Vulcan）”是一个空名称：该名称不涉及任何内容。自从帕门尼德（Parmenides）时代以来，空着的名字一直困扰着哲学家。语言哲学一直存在关于名称的内容是什么的长期争论，其中表达式的内容是它对句子所表达的命题的贡献包含它。一方面，直接参照理论家说名称的内容就是名称所指的对象。另一方面，Fregeans说名称的内容是 sense ，它表示名称所指的对象。空名称不代表任何东西。因此，在直接参考理论上，它们没有内容。结果，空名称给直接参考理论带来了许多问题。相比之下，根据弗雷格（Fregean）理论，空名称仍然可以包含内容（前提是某些感觉不代表任何对象）。结果，对于弗雷格理论，空名称不会带来太多问题。空名称给直接参考理论带来的问题已被提供来为拒绝该理论以支持其Fregean竞争对手提供理由。但是，基于这些理由而拒绝直接参考理论是错误的。为什么？因为，通过挪用Fregean资源，直接参考理论家可以为空名称带来的问题提供解决方案。还是我在这篇论文中争论。得出的主要教训是，直接参照理论家和Fregeans之间的争议，如果被正确理解，不是关于是否存在感官之争，而是关于哪里有感官之争。直接参照理论家和Fregeans都可以诉诸感官，但只有Fregeans认为感官是在包含名称的句子所表达的命题中。
展开▼
