Political economy aspects of supranational credit money proposals.

摘要

This dissertation is a descriptive analysis of three selected world currency proposals: Keynes's Bancor Proposal, International Monetary Fund Special Drawing Rights, and Guttmann's Supranational Credit Money Proposal. Specifically, the political economy aspect of these proposals is evaluated. The deficiencies of the current multicurrency arrangement, serving the international monetary system, are the major theme of these proposals. As a part of the investigation into the suggested reforms, many difficulties and benefits of achieving a monetary union are identified. The conclusions of my study put emphasis on the overdraft provisions of the proposals, issues of empowering the central institution through design of enforceable features, importance of maintaining political will of the participant nations, and the desirability of bringing symmetric adjustments to payment balance of individual nations. My thesis is that the current global economy requires an international nonmarket agency for regulating the international monetary system. Implemented, it would provide a multilateral character to international lending and provision of a truly international currency that would serve the increasing integration of economic activities more effectively.