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Leakage resilience and black-box impossibility results in cryptography.

机译:泄漏复原力和黑匣子不可能实现加密。

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摘要

In this thesis, we present constructions of leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives, and we give black-box impossibility results for certain classes of constructions of pseudo-random number generators.;The traditional approach for preventing side-channel attacks has been primarily hardware-based. Recently, there has been significant progress in developing algorithmic approaches for preventing such attacks. These algorithmic approaches involve modeling side-channel attacks as leakage on the internal state of a device; constructions secure against such leakage are leakage- resilient.;We first consider the problem of storing a key and computing on it repeatedly in a leakage-resilient manner. For this purpose, we define a new primitive called a key proxy. Using a fully-homomorphic public-key encryption scheme, we construct a leakage-resilient key proxy. We work in the "only computation leaks" leakage model, tolerating a logarithmic number of bits of polynomial-time computable leakage per computation and an unbounded total amount of leakage.;We next consider the problem of verifying that a message sent over a public channel has not been modified, in a setting where the sender and the receiver have previously shared a key, and where the adversary controls the public channel and is simultaneously mounting side-channel attacks on both parties. Using only the assumption that pseudo-random generators exist, we construct a leakage-resilient shared-private-key authenticated session protocol. This construction tolerates a logarithmic number of bits of polynomial-time computable leakage per computation, and an unbounded total amount of leakage. This leakage occurs on the entire state, input, and randomness of the party performing the computation.;Finally, we consider the problem of constructing a large-stretch pseudo-random generator given a one-way permutation or given a smaller-stretch pseudo-random generator. The standard approach for doing this involves repeatedly composing the given object with itself. We provide evidence that this approach is necessary. Specifically, we consider three classes of constructions of pseudo-random generators from pseudo-random generators of smaller stretch or from one-way permutations, and for each class, we give a black-box impossibility result that demonstrates a contrast between the stretch that can be achieved by adaptive and non-adaptive black-box constructions.
机译:在本文中,我们提出了防泄漏弹性密码基元的构造,并给出了某些类型的伪随机数生成器构造的黑匣子不可能结果。传统的防止边信道攻击的方法主要是基于硬件的。 。最近,在开发用于防止此类攻击的算法方法方面取得了重大进展。这些算法方法包括将侧信道攻击建模为设备内部状态的泄漏;防止这种泄漏的结构具有防泄漏的能力。我们首先考虑存储密钥并以防泄漏的方式反复计算密钥的问题。为此,我们定义了一个称为密​​钥代理的新原语。使用全同态公共密钥加密方案,我们构造了一个防泄漏的密钥代理。我们在“仅计算泄漏”泄漏模型中工作,允许每次计算多项式时间可计算泄漏的对数位数和无限制的泄漏总量。;接下来,我们考虑验证消息是否通过公共通道发送的问题在发送者和接收者之前共享密钥,敌方控制公共频道并同时对双方发起侧频道攻击的情况下,未进行任何修改。仅使用伪随机生成器存在的假设,我们构造了一个防泄漏的共享私钥认证会话协议。这种结构可以容忍每次计算的多项式时间可计算泄漏的对数位数,以及无限制的泄漏总量。这种泄漏发生在执行计算的一方的整个状态,输入和随机性上。最后,我们考虑在给定单向排列或给定较小拉伸伪随机数的情况下构造大拉伸伪随机生成器的问题。随机生成器。执行此操作的标准方法包括将给定对象与其自身重复组成。我们提供的证据表明这种方法是必要的。具体而言,我们考虑了三类伪随机生成器的构造,这些伪随机生成器的构造来自较小拉伸的伪随机生成器或单向置换,对于每种类别,我们给出了黑盒不可能结果,该结果证明了可以通过自适应和非自适应黑盒结构来实现。

著录项

  • 作者

    Juma, Ali.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Toronto (Canada).;

  • 授予单位 University of Toronto (Canada).;
  • 学科 Computer Science.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2011
  • 页码 181 p.
  • 总页数 181
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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