Ownership, privatization and banking regulation: Four essays in the economics of transition and development.

摘要

The dissertation contains four essays. These essays investigate banking regulation around the world, corporate governance in mixed ownership companies, economic reform in transition economies, and state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform, respectively.; The first essay is entitled "Banking Regulation around the World: Patterns, Determinants and Impact". In this essay, we empirically investigate the patterns, determinants, and impact of banking regulation in a large cross-section of countries. Different countries deal with their commercial banks in different ways. Major differences are found to be in four dimensions, i.e., the extent of government ownership of banks, the intensity of direct regulation of banks, the measures used to empower outside investors to monitor banks, and the comprehensiveness of explicit deposit insurance. Based on these four dimensions, we identify three major different patterns of banking regulation around the world: the India-China type characterized by dominant government ownership, the South Africa-Philippines-Mexico type characterized by dominant use of government direct regulation, and the Germany-US-Switzerland-France type characterized by dominant use of government empowerment. Further, we test economic, legal, and cultural theories of the determinants of the patterns of banking regulation.; The second essay is entitled "Corporate Governance of Mixed Ownership Firms in Transition: Evidence from China's Listed Companies". In this essay, we empirically examine corporate governance of mixed ownership firms where there coexist different ownerships in a company. It addresses the following questions: what is the impact of state ownership on the performance of mixed ownership enterprises in transition economies? Should state ownership be quickly reduced or kept at certain level in these firms?; The third essay is entitled "A Public Finance Perspective on State-Owned Enterprise Reform". In this essay, we present a public finance theory to explain the relation between state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform and governments' public goods provision in transition economies.; The fourth essay is entitled "Efficiency vs. Revenue: Discovering Governments' Incentives in Dumping State-Owned Enterprises". In this essay, we address the following question: what are the incentives of governments in privatizing or liquidating, i.e., dumping, state-owned enterprises (SOEs)? (Abstract shortened by UMI.)