This dissertation conducts research into the large-scale simulation of oligopolistic competition in wholesale electricity markets. The dissertation has two parts. Part I is an examination of the structure and properties of several spatial, or network, equilibrium models of oligopolistic electricity markets formulated as mixed linear complementarity problems (LCP). Part II is a large-scale application of such models to the electricity system that encompasses most of the United States east of the Rocky Mountains, the Eastern Interconnection.; Part I consists of Chapters 1 to 6. The models developed in this part continue research into mixed LCP models of oligopolistic electricity markets initiated by Hobbs [67] and subsequently developed by Metzler [87] and Metzler, Hobbs and Pang [88]. Hobbs' central contribution is a network market model with Cournot competition in generation and a price-taking spatial arbitrage firm that eliminates spatial price discrimination by the Cournot firms. In one variant, the solution to this model is shown to be equivalent to the “no arbitrage” condition in a “pool” market, in which a Regional Transmission Operator optimizes spot sales such that the congestion price between two locations is exactly equivalent to the difference in the energy prices at those locations (commonly known as locational marginal pricing). Extensions to this model are presented in Chapters 5 and 6. One of these is a market model with a profit-maximizing arbitrage firm. This model is structured as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC), but due to the linearity of its constraints, can be solved as a mixed LCP.; Part II consists of Chapters 7 to 12. The core of these chapters is a large-scale simulation of the U.S. Eastern Interconnection applying one of the Cournot competition with arbitrage models. This is the first oligopolistic equilibrium market model to encompass the full Eastern Interconnection with a realistic network representation (using a DC load flow approximation). Chapter 9 shows the price results. In contrast to prior market power simulations of these markets, much greater variability in price-cost margins is found when using a realistic model of hourly conditions on such a large network. Chapter 10 shows that the conventional concentration indices (HHIs) are poorly correlated with PCMs. Finally, Chapter 11 proposes that the simulation models are applied to merger analysis and provides two large-scale merger examples. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
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