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Internet QoS market analysis with peering and usage-sensitive pricing: A game theoretic and simulation approach.

机译:具有对等和对使用敏感的定价的Internet QoS市场分析:一种博弈论和模拟方法。

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One of the major areas for research and investment related to the Internet is the provision of quality of service (QoS). We remain confident that in the not-to-distance future, QoS will be introduced not only in private networks but in the whole Internet. QoS will bring some new features into the Internet market: (1) vertical product differentiation with BE and QoS, (2) usage-sensitive pricing with metering. In this dissertation, the equilibrium outcomes are analyzed when two rural Internet Access Providers (IAPs) interact with several business and technical strategies such as technology (BE or QoS), pricing scheme (flat-rate pricing or two-part tariff), interconnection (transit or peering) and investment in network capacity. To determine the equilibria, we construct a duopoly game model based on Cournot theory. We calibrate this model to data found in real markets. In this model, we study ten cases with a combination of strategic choices of two IAPs. We use two demand functions: one based on uniform distribution and the other based on empirical distribution which comes from the U.S. General Accounting Office (U.S. GAO) survey for Internet usage. We use a two-stage RNG (Random Number Generator) simulation and a linear regression for the latter. If we consider IAPs with the BE and the flat rate pricing as the current Internet, the equilibrium points of each case in this model suggest a progressive market equilibrium path to the future Internet market. Based on the equilibrium analysis of the game model, we conclude that (1) {lcub}QoS, two-part tariff, transit/peering{rcub} or {lcub}QoS, flat-rate pricing, peering{rcub} will be a plausible situation in the future Internet access market, (2) network capacity will still be an important strategy to determine market equilibrium in the future as well as in the current, (3) BE will take a considerable market share in the QoS Internet, and (4) peering arrangements in the QoS Internet will provide a higher social welfare than transit. These implications from the game analysis present an analytical framework for the future Internet policy.
机译:与Internet相关的研究和投资的主要领域之一是提供服务质量(QoS)。我们仍然相信,在不久的将来,QoS不仅会在专用网络中引入,而且会在整个Internet中引入。 QoS将为互联网市场带来一些新功能:(1)BE和QoS的垂直产品差异化;(2)计量的使用敏感性定价。本文研究了两个农村互联网接入提供商(IAP)与几种业务和技术策略(例如技术(BE或QoS),定价方案(统一费率或两部分费率),互连(传输或对等网络)和网络容量投资。为了确定均衡,我们基于古诺特理论构造了双寡头博弈模型。我们将此模型校准为实际市场中的数据。在此模型中,我们研究了两个IAP的战略选择相结合的十个案例。我们使用两个需求函数:一个基于统一分布,另一个基于经验分布,该函数来自美国总会计局(U.S. GAO)关于互联网使用情况的调查。我们使用两阶段的RNG(随机数生成器)模拟,并对后者进行线性回归。如果我们将具有BE和统一费率定价的IAP视为当前的Internet,则此模型中每种情况的均衡点都表明了通往未来Internet市场的渐进式市场均衡路径。基于博弈模型的均衡分析,我们得出结论:(1){lcub} QoS,两部分费率,转接/对等{rcub}或{lcub} QoS,统一费率定价,对等{rcub} (2)网络容量仍将是决定未来以及当前市场均衡的重要策略,(3)BE将在QoS Internet中占据相当大的市场份额,并且(4)QoS互联网中的对等安排将提供比传输更高的社会福利。游戏分析的这些含义为未来的互联网政策提供了一个分析框架。

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