Cassandra's dilemma: Intelligence support to multinational peacekeeping.

摘要

For reasons of Cold War politics, and subsequently for what would become known as "soft power," Canada has always been an enthusiastic player in the peacekeeping arena. Within these predominantly United Nations missions, supporting peacekeepers through intelligence operations has been an ever-present, but problematic, thorn. Democracy's presumption of openness and transparency is uncomfortable with secrecy, regardless of its necessity. This discomfort, however, is based largely upon misperceptions of intelligence.; The United Nations disdainfully views intelligence operations as "dirty"---to be shunned without exception. Yet peacekeeping, by definition, requires soldiers, and soldiers cannot operate efficiently without intelligence support. This thesis therefore examines the nature and conduct of military intelligence operations in order to show that it is an appropriate and necessary condition for effective multinational peacekeeping operations.; The research is presented within two general sections: intelligence, and multinational peacekeeping. The first portion provides an overview of intelligence activity, using the intelligence cycle of Direction, Collection, Processing, and Dissemination as a framework. Within each of these phases, emphasis is placed upon troublesome issues which plague intelligence in general, and peacekeeping intelligence, in particular.; The second section focuses more precisely upon the United Nations and its peacekeeping operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The research includes case studies of two peacekeeping missions, each considered stereotypical: Cyprus "worked" and was deemed a model for any future missions; Congo was mired in controversy, and proved as traumatic for the United Nations as was Vietnam for the United States.; Hopefully, some useful insights will benefit future peacekeepers, and the people they endeavour to assist.