If reason is not sovereign: The function of reason in Hume and consequences for the classical/positivist divide, rational choice theory, low self-control theory, and the criminal propensity construct.

摘要

This work shows that classical criminological doctrine has been misunderstood and that the consequences of this misunderstanding for contemporary criminological theory and research are grave. In particular, classical criminologists subscribe to a view of rationality that is strikingly different from that which is usually attributed to them. Classical criminologists deny that behavior is invariably rational, and hold that emotional considerations are determinative of the degree of rationality expressed in any given behavior. This view, called “emotional determinism”, is used to generate a theory of criminal propensity that can be empirically tested. The theory is intended as a replacement for Gottfredson and Hirschi's 1990 low self-control theory, which, while influential, succumbs to the criticism that it is too heavily reliant on rational choice principles. Finally, the work suggests that the genuine distinction between classical and positivist criminologies consists in the fact that as empiricists classical criminologists are committed to holding that environmental forces can in principle be used to dissuade even the most committed of criminals.