Philanthropy: Charting the Moral Terrain.

摘要

I begin with three simple questions. Should a wealthy person give to philanthropy? How much should they give? And, where should donations be made? I turn to Peter Singer's life-saving pond example to make an argument that philanthropy to aid agencies, which I call life-saving philanthropy, is in some cases obligatory and not merely supererogatory. Given a reasonable, or "modest" interpretation of Singer's argument, and the obligations that follow, I argue that for the very wealthy giving all (or nearly all) their wealth at death turns out to be the type of minimal sacrifice that is morally required.;I also argue that the modest principle does not preclude a suitable provision for heirs. I discuss what is "suitable," and what constitutes excessive consumption. Since you do not survive your own death, making donations at death represents the type of minimal sacrifice called for by Singer's argument. I follow Parfit and Cowen in arguing that lives in the future are of equal value to lives in the present, and so donations can be postponed until death.;When considering the potential recipients of philanthropy, I argue that life-saving philanthropy should constitute a meaningful percentage of philanthropic donations, but this does not preclude other types of philanthropy. In an appendix I take up the question of whether there are ethical reasons to restrict corporate philanthropy.