Essays on Executive Decisionmaking and Institutional Design.

摘要

The focus of this dissertation is on how institutional rules affect decision-making in the United States. The first essay uses a formal model to examine how bureaucratic appointments are made when bargaining takes place over both agency preferences and competence. I show that, under perfect information, agency incompetence does not result when the principals are solely concerned with policy. I then show that the inclusion of nonpolicy incentives can induce incompetence. In the second essay, I use a formal model to examine the influence of pre-nomination vetting of nominees on agency competence. The final essay introduces political science to the Weibull count model, which, under certain conditions, provides more accurate results than conventional count models. I then use this model to argue that the ability of the president to rally public support for his or her cause plays a larger role than previously thought when determining when bureaucratic agencies are created.