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The politics of the present: A relational theory of the self as a basis for political theory: Dewey, Arendt, and Levinas.

机译:当前的政治:作为政治理论基础的自我关系理论:杜威,阿伦特和列维纳斯。

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摘要

This dissertation is centrally concerned with the development of a theory of the self, through the works of John Dewey, Hannah Arendt, and Emmanuel Levinas, that can be of service to the theory of participatory democracy. The major issue in question is the nature of the self in terms of its potential for development toward active participation in democratic life, which requires a self that is unfinished and open to continual and self-directed change. Chapter 3, "The Self as Present: Relationality, Precariousness, and Desire," develops a plausible model of the self in this light through the three central concepts of relationality, precariousness, and desire. I give the label of the Present to this model of the self in order to highlight the temporal significance that arises through these features. Through the use of Dewey's, Arendt's, and Levinas' philosophies, I show that the self develops through its environing relations, especially with other selves, and that these relations are open and subject to creative development through their temporal precariousness. The self is also interpreted as a structure that develops out of natural existence through an event of ethical disruption. Lastly, a focus is placed on the desiring, initially non-cognitive, nature of the self, an approach that breaks the bounds of traditional rationalistic conceptions of the self. All three of these features serve as a basis for developing the political potential of the self in a participative democratic context.;The surrounding chapters all relate to chapter 3 as the centerpiece. Chapter 1, "Selfhood and Political Theory," establishes the difference between a theory of the self and a theory of essential human nature. The latter is shown, through historical examples, to obfuscate the truly radical openness of the self and to reduce political theory to a logical determinism rooted in essential human nature. Chapter 2, "The Critique of the History of Philosophy in Dewey," then establishes the relevance of Dewey, Arendt, and Levinas to this project through an elaboration of their respective critiques of the history of philosophy, each of which questions traditional forms of foundationalism and thus opens a path to the task of chapter 3.;With the self as Present developed in chapter 3, chapter 4, "The Present in Action: Thinking and Ethics as Political Activities," develops this model of the self as a basis for developing thinking and ethics as political activities. The chapter is dedicated to bringing Dewey, Arendt, and Levinas into critical dialogue, establishing the potency of thinking and ethics as political activities. With respect to thinking, the theories of Dewey and Arendt are put into both mutual and conflictual engagement to come to an activity of thinking that is relational, precarious, and rooted in desire. Then, with respect to ethics, a similar method is used, this time with Dewey and Levinas. Importantly, Levinas' ethical relation is interpreted as a pre-political activity in relation to Dewey's (and Arendt's) political ethics. The bridge between the two is Dewey's conception of problematic situations, which serves to highlight the proximity of the other person as an unsolvable problem in the experience of the self.;Chapter 5, "The Politics of the Present: Thoughtfulness as Political Virtue," completes this development by bringing thinking and ethics into a unitary form of political action characterized by the virtue of thoughtfulness. This is done again through the critical engagement of Dewey, Levinas, and Arendt in the attempt to build the theoretical model of ethical political action. Thoughtfulness is interpreted as a form of ethical political thinking that is dynamic and intersubjective in the expectation that successful democratic participation requires the learned ability to deal with political problems in the context of a plurality of other selves who demand ethical consideration. This chapter points toward the need for more work, especially in the context of the relation between education, politics, and ethics.
机译:本论文主要通过约翰·杜威,汉娜·阿伦特和伊曼纽尔·列维纳斯的著作来关注自我理论的发展,这可以为参与式民主理论服务。所讨论的主要问题是自我的性质,即其在积极参与民主生活中的发展潜力,这需要一个未完成的自我开放并接受持续不断的自我指导的改变。第3章“当下的自我:关系,不稳定和欲望”,通过关系,不稳定和欲望这三个中心概念,从这个角度发展了一个合理的自我模型。我将“现在”的标签赋予这种自我模型,以强调通过这些特征产生的时间意义。通过使用杜威,阿伦特和列维纳斯的哲学,我证明了自我是通过其与周围环境的关系发展的,尤其是与其他自我的关系,并且这些关系是开放的,并因其短暂的不稳定而受到创造性发展的影响。自我也被解释为通过道德破坏事件从自然存在中发展出来的结构。最后,重点放在对自我的渴望,最初是非认知的本质,这种方法打破了传统的理性自我概念的界限。所有这三个特征都是在参与性民主背景下发展自我的政治潜力的基础。周围的章节均以第3章为中心。第一章“自我与政治理论”确立了自我理论与基本人性论之间的区别。通过历史的例子表明,后者掩盖了自我的真正激进开放性,并将政治理论简化为植根于人性本质的逻辑决定论。然后,第2章“杜威哲学史批判”通过阐述他们各自对哲学史的批判,确立了杜威,阿伦特和列维纳斯与该项目的相关性,每种批判都质疑传统形式的基础主义。因此,这为第3章的任务开辟了道路。随着第3章第4章“行动中的现在:作为政治活动的思想和道德”的发展,现存的自我发展了这种自我的模型作为发展思想和道德作为政治活动。本章致力于将杜威,阿伦特和列维纳斯进行批判性对话,确立思想和道德作为政治活动的潜力。关于思维,杜威和阿伦特的理论被置于相互和冲突的参与之中,从而形成一种关系性的,不稳定的,根植于欲望的思维活动。然后,关于道德,这次使用的是杜威和列维纳斯的类似方法。重要的是,列维纳斯的伦理关系被解释为与杜威(和阿伦特)的政治伦理有关的政治前活动。两者之间的桥梁是杜威对问题处境的构想,这凸显了另一个人在自我体验中作为不可解决的问题的接近性。;第5章,“当前的政治:体贴为政治美德”通过将思想和道德纳入以体贴为特点的统一政治行动形式来完成这一发展。通过杜威,列维纳斯和阿伦特的批判性交往,试图建立道德政治行为的理论模型,这又得以实现。考虑周到被解释为一种道德政治思想的形式,它是动态的并且是主体间的,期望成功的民主参与需要在其他许多需要道德考虑的自我的背景下,具备学习处理政治问题的能力。本章指出需要做更多的工作,尤其是在教育,政治和道德之间的关系的背景下。

著录项

  • 作者

    Ott, Paul Matthew.;

  • 作者单位

    State University of New York at Buffalo.;

  • 授予单位 State University of New York at Buffalo.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.;Political Science General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2010
  • 页码 259 p.
  • 总页数 259
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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