My dissertation explores the alliance relationship between the U.S. and China during 1949--1972. The conventional wisdom held by many realists is that during the early Cold War period, the U.S. should have formed an alliance with China against the stronger Soviet power in Asia as it did in 1972. However, they argue, the U.S. had irrationally pursued a confrontational policy toward China due to domestic political pressures until the 1960s.; In my dissertation, I present a structural explanation that counters the domestic explanation. From late 1949, in the face of strong domestic pressures, the Truman administration persistently pursued a policy to form an alliance with China to improve the U.S. position in the bipolar competition. However, this policy was not feasible for structural reasons. In global balance and especially in Asia, the U.S. maintained its superiority in bipolarity on the basis of its greater strategic and economic capabilities. In these circumstances, China was forced to ally with the Soviet Union to balance the stronger U.S. power.; During the 1950s, China kept balancing the stronger U.S. with its Soviet ally. And the Eisenhower administration pursued a tough containment to reduce the relative power growth of China. This inimical relations was maintained in the 1960s as China continued to balance the stronger U.S.; In 1972, an alliance between the U.S. and China was formed. By the late 1960s, the Soviet Union upset the regional balance by building up its conventional and nuclear forces in Asia while reaching parity with the U.S. in global balance. This structural change compelled China to seek an ally to balance the stronger Soviet power in Asia. As a consequence, the U.S. and China formed an alliance to check the Soviet dominance in Asia in spite of strong political and ideological constraints.; Thus my study finds that the alliance relationships between the U.S. and China before and after 1972 are explained by power structures. Theoretically, these hard cases vindicate the balance of power theory by showing how powerfully the distributions of capabilities shape the alliance choices and their outcomes under anarchy.
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