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Power and class conflict in capitalist democracy: Business contributions, labor contributions, and two decades of legislative influence in the United States.

机译:资本主义民主制中的权力与阶级冲突:在美国的商业贡献,劳动贡献和二十年的立法影响。

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摘要

What role do special interest groups play in governmental decision making? Social scientists have debated the role of special interests in governmental decision making for decades with little consensus. Three main competing theories emerge from these debates: state-centered theory, pluralism, and elite-power theory. In my dissertation, I directly test hypotheses derived from these theories. Using longitudinal data, I statistically analyze the influence of special interest groups on governmental decision making by examining how Political Action Committee (PAC) campaign contributions influence legislators' roll call votes over a twenty-year period in the U.S. House, 1985--2004, controlling for factors considered important in roll call voting. Converting my variables into separate legislator-by-legislator matrixes to account for similarities of legislative behavior, I employ an innovative statistical method (Quadratic Assignment Procedure, or 'QAP,' regression) that has a proven record of eliminating the problems associated with relational data.; My findings show a statistically significant impact of PAC contributions on roll call voting, net of other factors---including party. This significant impact is consistent across all twenty years. Further, the findings show that big business PAC contributions have a significant effect on roll call voting, while labor PAC contributions are less significant, particularly in recent years. These findings support the predictions of elite-power theory but fail to support state-centered and pluralist theories. In addition to contributing to the debates among social scientists over class, power, and the role of special interest groups in governmental decision making, my research has policy-oriented implications. In particular, the findings imply that under our current campaign finance system the voices of the people could be muffled by the calls of special interests, suggesting reform may be needed.
机译:特殊利益集团在政府决策中扮演什么角色?几十年来,社会科学家们一直在争论特殊利益在政府决策中的作用,却鲜有共识。这些辩论中出现了三种主要的竞争理论:以国家为中心的理论,多元化和精英权力理论。在我的论文中,我直接检验了从这些理论得出的假设。我使用纵向数据,通过研究政治行动委员会(PAC)竞选捐款如何影响1985--2004年美国众议院20年期间的议员点名表决,来统计分析特殊利益集团对政府决策的影响,控制在唱名表决中被认为重要的因素。将我的变量转换为单独的立法者矩阵,以解决立法行为的相似性,我采用了一种创新的统计方法(二次赋值程序或“ QAP”回归),该方法具有消除与关系数据相关的问题的可靠记录。 。;我的发现表明,扣除其他因素(包括政党),PAC捐款对唱名投票的统计意义重大。这一重大影响在整个二十年中都是一致的。此外,研究结果还表明,大型企业PAC捐款对唱名投票有重大影响,而劳动力PAC捐款的重要性不高,尤其是在最近几年。这些发现支持了精英权力理论的预言,但未能支持以国家为中心的多元化理论。除了促进社会科学家之间关于阶级,权力以及特殊利益集团在政府决策中的作用的辩论之外,我的研究还具有政策导向的意义。特别是,这些发现暗示,在我们当前的竞选财务制度下,特殊利益的呼吁可能会掩盖人民的声音,这表明可能需要进行改革。

著录项

  • 作者

    Peoples, Clayton D.;

  • 作者单位

    The Ohio State University.;

  • 授予单位 The Ohio State University.;
  • 学科 Sociology Social Structure and Development.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2005
  • 页码 134 p.
  • 总页数 134
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 社会结构和社会关系;
  • 关键词

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