Enhancing monitoring and enforcement in intergovernmental organizations: When and why states grant consultative status to NGOs.

摘要

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are no longer solely owned and occupied by states. Instead, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) now play a major role in the day-to-day operations and annual strategic meetings of many IGOs. Yet International Relations scholarship has not kept pace with these realities on the ground; we continue to treat IGOs as if states and the bureaucracies they create are the only important actors in these complex entities. At least a third of IGOs now grant consultative status to NGOs which provides many non-state actors with a wide and deep ability to access and influence IGO operations.;This pattern does not appear to have hit stasis but instead has continued to rise both as the supply of NGOs has increased and the demands of IGOs have become more complex. And yet, this pattern is not symmetric across the broad set of IGOs; many IGOs choose to restrict access to NGOs and purposefully prevent their entry. These empirical patterns suggest a fundamental question: when and why do IGOs grant consultative status to NGOs? These relationships are particularly puzzling when we place the sovereignty of states at the center: NGO accreditation could lead to IGO agenda manipulation, increased bargaining costs, and the potential loss of secrecy. Why do member states allow NGOs to sometimes have a seat at the IGO table?;Instead of NGO consultative status infringing upon states' independence, I argue that member states grant consultative status to NGOs to maintain their autonomy. IGO member states grant consultative status to NGOs to assist with monitoring and enforcement efforts. NGOs can name and shame dissident states without IGO members formally delegating to IGO bureaucrats that might 'runaway' with their contractual power. Furthermore states can rely on officially accredited NGOs rather than punishing violator states directly, avoiding collective action challenges and diplomatic costs.;This has implications for which NGOs gain consultative status. IGOs can indeed be principals, but the data show that states largely control the NGO consultative status decision. States choose and support NGOs that act as allies in monitoring and enforcing their interests in the international agreement. This means that while we recognize the increasing agency of NGOs and the changing nature of global governance, member states remain savvy in formally allowing roles for non-state actors in IGOs.;But the relationship is certainly not a one-way street: NGOs do not eagerly agree to the onerous requirements associated with consultative status purely out of the 'goodness of their hearts.' NGOs are not benevolent information providers. Instead, NGOs also gain material benefits such as increased legitimacy, fundraising, and an augmented ability to influence global political decisions when they are granted consultative status with IGOs.;In order to test my predictions, I statistically evaluate an original dataset of NGO consultative status across ~300 IGOs. I next conduct a quantitative case study of state-level decisions about NGO accreditation in the UN ECOSOC across the last 30 years. I also triangulate my research with a set of three rich case studies to trace the causal mechanisms. In particular, these cases examine the material benefits that NGOs derive from consultative status. I end by suggesting a number of open questions and future areas of research that can build on these initial findings. The theoretical and policy implications of this project touch on issues of institutional design, compliance, delegation, and the increasing role of non-state actors in world politics.