The use of 'carrots' and 'sticks' in Japanese aid policy towards China 1989--2001: How electoral politics shapes foreign economic policy.

摘要

In this dissertation I seek to explain Japanese foreign policymaking towards China by focusing on policy changes. In particular, I investigate how domestic politics influence shifts in foreign policy. The core argument of this research is that Japanese politicians delegate foreign policymaking authority to bureaucrats. However, when politicians are facing electoral pressures that cause their preferences to diverge from those of bureaucrats, politicians intervene in the policymaking process to limit bureaucratic discretion. This is to ensure that the foreign policy choice assumed most likely to win these politicians votes is implemented.; In order to test my argument, I investigate Japanese aid policy towards China. The form that Japan's ODA strategy towards China has traditionally taken is one of economic engagement to promote Chinese stability and friendly bilateral relations. And yet, on three occasions, Japan's foreign aid policy towards China shifted away from engagement: economic sanctions after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, the 1995-1996 freeze of grant aid after China's underground nuclear tests, and the 2000-2001 review and reduction of ODA to China after increased Chinese military expenditures and continuing economic woes for Japan. My findings show that these policy shifts were determined by the constraints and opportunities that politicians faced, given the institutional realities of electoral politics. Public preferences shifted dramatically from the late 1980s, as public sentiment grew increasingly critical of a policy of awarding aid to a country that was conducting nuclear tests, increasing military expenditures, expanding its military activities, and growing economically at an incredible rate. Under the circumstances of volatile voting patterns and an electoral system that called for greater attention to policy issues, politicians became more responsive to such public preferences and acted to ensure that policy outcomes were generally in accordance with those preferences.