首页> 外文会议>Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) 46th annual meeting >BUILDING A GENUINE U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY
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BUILDING A GENUINE U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY

机译:建立真正的美俄伙伴关系以确保核安全

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As Russia’s economy improves and its government becomes more assertive, a shift from a donorrecipientrnrelationship to a more genuine partnership is likely to be essential to the success of cooperativernefforts to improve nuclear security and accounting – particularly to achieving the working-level Russianrn“buy-in” to the new security and accounting approaches so crucial to long-term sustainability. Substantialrnevidence from other types of assistance indicates that assistance programs that directly involve the recipientsrnin all aspects of the conception, design, implementation, and evaluation of the effort have far higher successrnrates than those that do not. This paper describes specific modifications to U.S. and Russian policies thatrncould help shift programs to improve nuclear security and accounting from a donor-recipient relationship to arnmore genuine partnership. To achieve a genuine partnership, Russia will have to assign more of its ownrnresources to improving nuclear security, and change its recent practice of, in essence, not paying for anythingrnthat the United States might be convinced to pay for. The United States will have to have the flexibility tornmake all stages of the work truly joint efforts, with Russian experts playing key roles in all the stages justrnnoted. The paper will provide specific examples on both sides (such as the Russian decision to cease payingrnthe minor sums required to install U.S.-provided “quick fix” security upgrade equipment at nuclear warheadrnsites once discussions of U.S. funding for that effort began – despite incidents of terrorist reconnaissance atrnthose warhead sites, and the U.S. practice of having an evaluation team assessing each nuclear materialrnsecurity project that includes no Russian members and little Russian input). The paper will also outlinernpossibilities for the United States and Russia, following through on the Bratislava summit statement, to workrnin partnership to improve nuclear security in other countries around the world – an approach that would alsornbe likely to improve the political atmosphere for nuclear security cooperation within Russia.
机译:随着俄罗斯经济的改善和政府的变得更加自信,从捐助者接受关系到更真诚的伙伴关系的转变可能对成功地改善核安全和核算的合作努力至关重要,特别是对于实现工作水平的俄罗斯“买入” ”对于长期可持续性至关重要的新安全和会计方法。其他类型援助的大量证据表明,与受援者直接参与努力的概念,设计,实施和评估的各个方面相比,援助方案的成功率要高得多。本文介绍了对美国和俄罗斯政策的具体修改,这些修改可能有助于将旨在改善核安全和核算的计划从捐助方与受援方的关系转变为更多的真正伙伴关系。为了建立真正的伙伴关系,俄罗斯将不得不分配更多自己的资源来改善核安全,并改变其最近的做法,即实质上不支付任何可能被说服美国支付的费用。美国将不得不灵活地使工作的各个阶段真正地共同努力,而俄罗斯专家则在所有阶段都扮演着关键角色。该文件将提供双方的具体例子(例如,一旦美国开始讨论为这种努力提供资金的讨论,俄罗斯将决定停止支付在核弹头现场安装美国提供的“快速修复”安全升级设备所需的少量款项)侦察性核弹头站点,以及美国的做法是让评估小组评估每个不包括俄罗斯成员且俄罗斯投入很少的核材料安全项目。该文件还将概述布拉迪斯拉发首脑会议声明之后,美国和俄罗斯有可能建立伙伴关系,以改善世界其他国家的核安全–这种方法也有可能改善内部核安全合作的政治气氛俄国。

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