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Searching out of Trading Noise: A Study of Intraday Transactions Cost

机译:搜索交易噪音:对盘中交易的成本研究

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We attempt to identify in this paper the role of trading noise as a transactions cost to market participant in the sense of Stoll (2000), especially in the presence of trading concentration. Applying the measures of Hu (2006) and Kang and Yeo (2008), we analyze the noise proportion in intraday stock returns and its interaction with investor herding and search cost. Although this noise is high on individual orders and low on institutional orders, its behavior at market open is entirely different from the rest of the day. Noises for small cap stocks, unlike volatilities, are lower than those for large cap stocks. We also found that noise relates positively to trading volume, but inversely to holdings and turnover ratio of institutional investors. Responses from institutional and individuals are quite the opposite. The noise proportion generated by individual order rises with institutional turnover and search cost encountered, while that of institutional order behaves just oppositely. At market open, behaviors of noise from institutional and individual orders just switch mutually, and then switch back afterwards. Also, noise from high-cap stocks is actually more responsive than that from low-cap ones across investors. So trading noise is a specific transactions cost, prominent to only certain investors, at certain time and for certain stocks in the market, rather than a general market friction as argued in Stoll (2000). This transactions cost is inversely related to search costs encountered in trading, which depends on investor, trading hour of day and market capitalization of stocks.
机译:我们试图在本文中识别交易噪声作为交易到市场参与者在STOLL(2000)意义上的交易成本的作用,特别是在交易集中的存在。应用胡(2006)和康与yeo(2008)的措施,我们分析了盘区股票回报的噪音比例及其与投资者进攻和搜索成本的互动。虽然这种噪音对单个订单和机构订单的低位较低,但其在市场开放的行为与一天中的其他地方完全不同。与挥发性不同,小帽股的噪音低于大帽股。我们还发现噪声与交易量积极相关,但对机构投资者的持股和营业额与营业额度呈现。机构和个人的回应是相反的。各个订单产生的噪音比例随机构营业额和搜索成本而上升,而制度秩序的行为恰到好处。在市场开放时,机构和个人订单的噪声行为只需相互开启,然后后退回来。此外,来自高帽股票的噪音实际上比投资者的低帽子更响应。因此,交易噪音是特定的交易成本,只有某些投资者,在某些时间和市场上某些股票,而不是在STOLL(2000)中争论的一般市场摩擦。该交易成本与交易中遇到的搜索成本相反,这取决于投资者,日期的交易时间和股票的市场资本化。

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