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Empirical Study on Diversification Strategy, CEO Compensation Gap Design and Company Performance

机译:多元化战略的实证研究,CEO补偿差距设计与公司绩效

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The study explores the moderating effects of CEO compensation gap on the relationship between diversification strategy and corporate performance from top management team coordination perspective. Furthermore, the author puts forward two competing hypotheses based on behavior theory and tournament theory. 797 Sample companies are listed companies selected from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Empirical results show that damage of corporate diversification strategy to corporate performance may be due to the existence of moral hazard during strategy implementation by senior executives. Thus enlarging CEO compensation gap can effectively align interests between managers and shareholders, indicating that tournament theory dominate solving the coordination problems of top management team in the context of China's institutional backgrounds,and the theory can play a greater strategic support effect.
机译:该研究探讨了首席执行官补偿差距对多元化战略与企业绩效与最高管理团队协调视角的关系的调节效应。此外,作者基于行为理论和锦标赛理论提出了两个竞争假设。 797家公司是从上海和深圳股票交易所选出的公司。经验结果表明,企业多元化战略对企业绩效的损害可能是由于高级管理人员战略实施期间的道德风险存在。因此,扩大CEO补偿差距可以有效地对准管理者和股东之间的利益,表明锦标赛理论在中国制度背景下解决了顶级管理团队的协调问题,该理论可以发挥更大的战略支持效应。

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