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Effects of Penalty and Probability of Punishment on Cooperative Behavior in 2-person Prisoner's Dilemma Situation

机译:惩罚与惩罚概率对2人囚犯困境情况的合作行为的影响

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In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behavior. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in a organization leads to violation of social rules, and at the worst case it suffers from serious accidents or scandals. Therefore, it is very important for organizational managers to make efforts and take measures to enhance cooperative behavior. Although there seem to be many ways to constantly elicit cooperative behavior, the punishment is one of the most effective measures for enhancing cooperation. This study focused on the effects of penalty and probability of punishment on the cooperation, and getting insight into how punishment strategy should be used to get rid of social dilemmas and enhance cooperation. This study conducted two simulation experiments to find the optimal penal regulations condition that can suppress violations (defective behavior) in a 2-person Prisoner's dilemma situation. The effects of probability of punishment and penalty on the cooperative behavior were identified with the interactive effect of both experimental factors. The defect (no-cooperative behavior) decreased when the punishment penalty was heavy and the probability of the defect revealing was low than when the punishment penalty was light and the probability of the defect revealing was high.
机译:在我们的社会中,提高合作行为是一个重大问题。没有这个,我们的社会陷入社交困境情况,变得更糟,更糟糕。组织中的这种情况导致侵犯社会规则,并且在最严重的情况下,它受到严重事故或丑闻的困扰。因此,组织管理人员对努力并采取措施来提高合作行为非常重要。虽然似乎有很多方法来不断引出合作行为,但惩罚是加强合作的最有效措施之一。本研究重点是惩罚和惩罚概率对合作的影响,并深入了解惩罚战略如何摆脱社会困境,加强合作。本研究进行了两项模拟实验,以找到可能抑制违规(缺陷行为)在2人类囚犯困境中的最佳刑法条件。惩罚和惩罚概率对合作行为的影响是通过两种实验因素的互动效应来确定。当惩罚罚款重大时,缺陷(无合作行为)减少,缺陷露出的概率低于惩罚罚款的光线,缺陷露出的概率很高。

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