Successful firms, such as Intel, maintain an innovative environment, seek continuous performance improvement, favor customer orientation (e.g. through partnerships with customers and suppliers), enhance results orientation, and place speed of creation, defense and development of value-chains at the core of their strategic focus. To maintain its leadership, Intel developed "war rooms", and encouraged informal relationships that crisscrossed organizational boundaries. Nevertheless, when Intel had to face InfoWar practices, it had to acknowledge that the company failed to prevent and to anticipate large-scale Info-destabilization. New businesses live on the brink of disasters. Yet, "organizations have many stabilizers but quite often lack proper destabilizers" (1). We will argue in this paper that InfoWar Q informational arena-based warfare Q has been thought within the boundaries of old schemata that will no longer be accurate in the XXIst century. These schemata includes misconceptions of management, organizations, economics, welfare and of purpose of development. We will investigate, in the footsteps of Hedberg, Jonsson, Starbuck, Steele, Wilensky, and many others, design principles that worked, and no longer worked. Founding our comments on observations of real-world experiences, we end with recommendations as to prepare nations, organizations and people for the forthcoming paradigm shift: from InfoWar to Knowledge Warfare (K-Warfare).
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