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The game analysis and countermeasures study of rent-seeking behavior of engineering supervisor

机译:工程监理人员寻租行为的博弈分析与对策研究

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The rent-seeking action of engineering supervisor is a problem which the construction management departments at all levels always attach great importance to. With the further analysis of the relationship among contractor, engineering supervisor and owner in this paper, rent-seeking theory is employed to investigate the motive of the rent-seeking between engineering supervisor and contractor. Based on the principalagent theory, this paper establishes a three party game model of contractor, engineering supervisor and employer, analyses the model and the game result in detail and puts forward measures to reduce the rent-seeking action of engineering supervisor.
机译:工程监理人员的寻租行为是各级建设管理部门始终高度重视的问题。通过对承包商,工程监理与业主之间关系的进一步分析,运用寻租理论研究了工程监理与承包商之间寻租的动机。基于委托代理理论,建立了承包商,工程监理和用人单位的三方博弈模型,对模型和博弈结果进行了详细分析,提出了减少工程监理寻租行为的措施。

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