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Risk-Based Decision-Making Fallacies: Why Present Functional Safety Standards are Not Enough

机译:基于风险的决策谬论:为什么目前的功能安全标准不够

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Functional safety of a system is the part of its overall safety that depends on the system operating correctly in response to its inputs. Safety is defined as the absence of unacceptable/unreasonable risk by functional safety standards, which enforce safety requirements in each phase of the development process of safety-critical software and hardware systems. Acceptability of risks is judged within a framework of analysis with contextual and cultural aspects by individuals who may introduce subjectivity and misconceptions in the assessment. While functional safety standards elaborate much on the avoidance of unreasonable risk in the development of safety-critical software and hardware systems, little is addressed on the issue of avoiding unreasonable judgments of risk. Through the studies of common fallacies in risk perception and ethics, we present a moral-psychological analysis of functional safety standards and propose plausible improvements of the involved risk-related decision making processes, with a focus on the notion of an acceptable residual risk. As a functional safety reference model, we use the functional safety standard ISO 26262, which addresses potential hazards caused by malfunctions of software and hardware systems within road vehicles and defines safety measures that are required to achieve an acceptable level of safety. The analysis points out the critical importance of a robust safety culture with developed countermeasures to the common fallacies in risk perception, which are not addressed by contemporary functional safety standards. We argue that functional safety standards should be complemented with the analysis of potential hazards caused by fallacies in risk perception, their countermeasures, and the requirement that residual risks must be explicated, motivated, and accompanied by a plan for their continuous reduction. This approach becomes especially important in contemporary developed autonomous vehicles with increasing computational control by increasingly intelligent software applications.
机译:系统的功能安全是系统总体安全的一部分,它取决于系统响应其输入是否正确运行。安全被定义为功能安全标准中不存在不可接受/不合理的风险,这些功能标准在对安全至关重要的软件和硬件系统的开发过程的每个阶段中都提出了安全要求。风险的可接受性是在个人可能会在评估中引入主观性和误解的个人根据上下文和文化方面的分析框架中进行判断的。尽管功能安全标准在避免安全性至关重要的软件和硬件系统的开发中详细阐述了如何避免不合理的风险,但在避免不合理的风险判断方面却很少涉及。通过研究风险感知和道德方面的常见谬误,我们提出了对功能安全标准的道德心理分析,并提出了对涉及的风险相关决策过程的合理改进,重点是可接受的剩余风险的概念。作为功​​能安全参考模型,我们使用功能安全标准ISO 26262,该标准解决了道路车辆内的软件和硬件系统故障引起的潜在危害,并定义了达到可接受安全水平所需的安全措施。分析指出了强有力的安全文化的至关重要性,这种文化具有针对风险感知中常见谬误的已开发对策,而当前的功能安全标准并未对此加以解决。我们认为,功能安全标准应辅以对风险感知中的谬误造成的潜在危害的分析,对策以及对残留风险必须加以说明,加以激励并附有持续降低计划的要求的补充。这种方法在当代开发的自动驾驶汽车中尤为重要,因为它通过越来越智能的软件应用程序增加了计算控制。

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