首页> 外文会议>International topical meeting on nuclear reactor thermal hydraulics >SEVERE ACCIDENT PROGRESSION IN THE BWR LOWER PLENUM AND THE MODES OF VESSEL FAILURE
【24h】

SEVERE ACCIDENT PROGRESSION IN THE BWR LOWER PLENUM AND THE MODES OF VESSEL FAILURE

机译:BWR下气室严重事故进展和血管衰竭的模式

获取原文

摘要

Most of our knowledge base on the severe accident progression in the lower plenum of LWRs is based on the data obtained from the TMI-2 accident. It should be recognized that the lower plenum of a BWR is very different from that of a PWR. Unlike the PWR, the BWR plenum is full of control rod guide tubes (CRGTs) with their axial structural variations. These CRGTs are arranged in a cellular fashion with each CRGT supporting 4 rod bundles. There are also a large number of instrument guide tubes (IGTs), each generally placed in the middle of 4CRGTs. Both the CRGTs and IGTs traverse the thick vessel bottom wall and are welded to their extensions which come to bottom of the core. The core-melt progression in the lower plenum is controlled by the structures present and they, in turn, influence the timings and the modes of vessel failure for a BWR. The Uranium oxide- Zirconium oxide core melt formed in the 4 fuel bundles is directed by the structure below towards the water regions in-between the 4 CRGTs. The FCI will take place in those water regions and some particulate debris will be created, although there is insufficient water for quenching the melt. A FCI may occur inside a CRGT if and when the melt breaches the wall of the CRGT. The important issue is whether the welding holding the IGT inside the vessel will fail and the bottom part of the IGT falls out creating a hole in the vessel with release of melt/ particulate debris to the containment. Similarly the failure of CRGT could have melt/particulate debris coming out of the vessel. These modes of vessel failure appear to be credible and they could occur before any large-scale melting and melt pool convection takes place. These modes of vessel failure and the melt release to the containment will have very different consequences than those generated by the other modes of vessel failure. Such BWR plenum melt progression scenarios have been considered in this paper. Some results of analyses performed at KTH have been described. We believe that the issues raised are important enough to consider a set of experiments for verification and validation of the melt progression in a BWR plenum. Such experiments are proposed.
机译:我们大多数关于轻水堆下层严重事故进展的知识都是基于从TMI-2事故获得的数据。应当认识到,BWR的下气室与PWR的下气室非常不同。与PWR不同,BWR增压室充满了控制杆导管(CRGT),它们的轴向结构有所不同。这些CRGT以蜂窝方式排列,每个CRGT支持4个杆束。还有大量的仪器导管(IGT),每个通常放置在4CRGT的中间。 CRGT和IGT都穿过厚的容器底壁,并焊接到延伸到岩心底部的延伸部分。下腔室中的熔芯融化过程受存在的结构控制,它们反过来影响BWR的时间和血管破裂的方式。在下面的结构中,在4个燃料束中形成的氧化铀-氧化锆核芯熔体指向4个CRGT之间的水域。尽管没有足够的水淬火熔体,但FCI将在那些水域发生,并会产生一些颗粒状的碎屑。如果熔体突破了CRGT的壁,则可能会在CRGT内发生FCI。重要的问题是将IGT固定在容器中的焊接是否会失败,并且IGT的底部掉落,从而在容器中形成一个孔,从而将熔体/微粒碎屑释放到安全壳中。同样,CRGT的故障可能会使熔体/颗粒碎屑从容器中逸出。这些容器故障模式似乎是可信的,并且可能在任何大规模的熔化和熔池对流发生之前发生。这些模式的容器故障以及熔体释放到安全壳中的后果将与其他模式的容器故障所产生的后果截然不同。本文已经考虑了这种BWR增压熔体进展方案。已经描述了在KTH进行的分析的一些结果。我们认为,提出的问题足够重要,可以考虑进行一系列实验来验证和确认BWR充气室内的融化进程。提出了这样的实验。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号