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On-chip Data Security Against Untrustworthy Software and Hardware IPs in Embedded Systems

机译:在嵌入式系统中对不值得信任的软件和硬件IPS的片上数据安全性

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State-of-the-art system-on-chip (SoC) field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) integrate hard powerful ARM processor cores and the reconfigurable logic fabric on a single chip in addition to many commonly needed high performance and high-bandwidth peripherals. The increasing reliance on untrustworthy third-party IP (3PIP) cores, including both hardware and software in FPGA-based embedded systems has made the latter increasingly vulnerable to security attacks. Detection of trojans in 3PIPs is extremely difficult to current static detection methods since there is no golden reference model for 3PIPs. Moreover, many FPGA-based embedded systems do not have the support of security services typically found in operating systems. In this paper, we present our run-time, low-cost, and low-latency hardware and software based solution for protecting data stored in on-chip memory blocks, which has attracted little research attention. The implemented memory protection design consists of a hierarchical top-down structure and controls memory access from software IPs running on the processor and hardware IPs running in the FPGA, based on a set of rules or access rights configurable at run time. Additionally, virtual addressing and encryption of data for each memory help protect confidentiality of data in case of a failure of the memory protection unit, making it hard for the attacker to gain access to the data stored in the memory. The design is implemented and tested on the Intel (Altera) DE1-SoC board featuring a SoC FPGA that integrates a dual-core ARM processor with reconfigurable logic and hundreds of memory blocks. The experimental results and case studies show that the protection model is successful in eliminating malicious IPs from the system without need for reconfiguration of the FPGA. It prevents unauthorized accesses from untrusted IPs, while arbitrating access from trusted IPs generating legal memory requests, without incurring a serious area or latency penalty.
机译:除了许多常用的高性能和高带宽外围设备之外,最先进的片上系统(SoC)现场可编程门阵列(FPGA)在单个芯片上集成了硬强大的ARM处理器内核和可重新配置的逻辑面料。越来越依赖不值得信任的第三方IP(3PIP)核心,包括基于FPGA的嵌入式系统中的硬件和软件,使后者越来越容易受到安全攻击的影响。 3PIPS中的特洛伊木马在静态检测方法中检测到极困难,因为3个单位没有金色参考模型。此外,许多基于FPGA的嵌入式系统不具有通常在操作系统中找到的安全服务的支持。在本文中,我们介绍了我们的运行时间,低成本和低延迟硬件和基于软件的解决方案,用于保护存储在片上存储器块中的数据,这引起了很少的研究。实现的内存保护设计包括分层自上而下的结构,并根据运行时配置的一组规则或访问权限,控制来自在FPGA中运行的处理器和硬件IPS上运行的软件IPS的内存访问。另外,在存储器保护单元故障的情况下,每个存储器的数据的虚拟寻址和加密有助于保护数据的机密性,使攻击者难以访问存储在存储器中的数据。该设计在英特尔(Altera)DE1-SOC板上实现和测试,该SOC FPGA具有集成了具有可重新配置逻辑和数百个内存块的双芯臂处理器。实验结果和案例研究表明,保护模型是成功消除系统的恶意IP,而无需重新配置FPGA。它可以防止未经信任的IPS的未经授权访问,同时从受信任的IPS生成法律记忆请求的仲裁访问,而不会产生严重的区域或延迟损失。

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