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Price and quality competition in a duopoly with reference-dependent preferences

机译:具有参考依赖性的双头垄断中的价格和质量竞争

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Research in marketing and psychology shows that customers exhibit reference-dependent preferences, which means the relative standing of a product in a choice set will affect its utility. Consequently, this reference dependency will affect the firms' decision on the price and quality. In particular, we study a model of two firms offering differentiated products in a covered duopoly market. They simultaneously choose the quality of the product and then compete in price. Customers decide which firm to purchase from based on a general utility function comprised of the standard consumption utility and the comparative utility which captures the reference-dependent value. We investigate the optimal pricing and quality decisions for each firm under the reference dependency effect. We also study the impact the reference dependency has on market share and profit of each firm. The goal of this paper attempts to fill the gap between our understanding of the reference-dependent behavior of customers and the firm's quality differentiation strategy.
机译:市场营销和心理学研究表明,客户表现出与参考有关的偏好,这意味着产品在选择集中的相对地位将影响其效用。因此,这种参考依赖性将影响企业对价格和质量的决策。特别是,我们研究了在有覆盖的双寡头市场上提供差异化​​产品的两家公司的模型。他们同时选择产品的质量,然后在价格上竞争。客户根据由标准消费效用和获取参考相关价值的比较效用组成的通用效用函数来决定从哪家公司购买商品。在参考依赖效应下,我们调查了每个公司的最优定价和质量决策。我们还研究了参考依赖对每家公司的市场份额和利润的影响。本文的目的是试图填补我们对客户的参考依赖行为的理解与公司的质量差异化战略之间的空白。

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