首页> 外文会议>The IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications >Playing Defense by Offense: Equilibrium in the DoS-attack problem
【24h】

Playing Defense by Offense: Equilibrium in the DoS-attack problem

机译:进攻攻防:DoS攻击问题中的平衡

获取原文

摘要

We develop defenses from resource-exhausting Denial-of-Service attacks initiated by an attacker to a server. The attacker does not have a permanent identity but spoofs the IP addresses for other users. Generalizing the Defense-by-Offense approach we enable benign users to obtain low service time by re-submitting requests according to a game-theoretic strategy. The attacker that tries to overwhelm the server by a constant stream of requests cannot succeed as its requests are dropped by the server. We derive optimal strategies for the server, as well as the attacker. We show that in the equilibrium state, the server can successfully repel the attackers with selective processing of requests. Simulations using OMNeT++ support analytical results.
机译:我们针对攻击者向服务器发起的耗竭资源的拒绝服务攻击进行防御。攻击者没有永久身份,但会欺骗其他用户的IP地址。泛化“进攻防御”方法,我们使良性用户能够根据博弈论策略重新提交请求,从而获得较低的服务时间。试图通过恒定的请求流使服务器不堪重负的攻击者无法成功,因为服务器丢弃了其请求。我们为服务器以及攻击者得出最佳策略。我们表明,在平衡状态下,服务器可以通过选择性处理请求来成功击退攻击者。使用OMNeT ++进行的仿真支持分析结果。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号