首页> 外文会议>2008 International Conference of Management Science and Engineering(2008管理科学与工程国际学术会议)论文集 >Study on Unbalance of Double-entrusted Responsibility of Financial Directors in State-owned Enterprises
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Study on Unbalance of Double-entrusted Responsibility of Financial Directors in State-owned Enterprises

机译:国有企业财务负责人双重承担责任失衡问题研究

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The unbalance that the double-entrusted responsibility of financial directors in state-owned enterprises inclines to managers does great harm to the interests of the nation and the staff. It causes vacancy of the nadon's supervision of managers and the hidden dangers in moral hazard of the managers.It protrudes the moral hazards of financial directors, which greatly increases the possibility of state-owned assets loss and corruption in enterprise manager level. This article, on the premise of systematic analysis of the reasons to the unbalance of double-entrusted responsibility of financial directors in state-owned enterprises, puts forward suggestions on the policy of perfecting the mechanism of double-entrusted responsibility of financial directors in state-owned enterprises.
机译:国有企业金融董事的双委托责任倾向于管理人员对该国家和工作人员的利益造成巨大危害。它导致纳多伦对管理人员的监督的职位以及经理道德风险的隐性危险。突出了金融董事的道德危害,这大大提高了国有资产损失和企业经理水平腐败的可能性。本文在系统分析的前提下,对国有企业的金融董事的双委托责任不平衡的原因,提出了关于完善国家金融董事的双委托责任机制的政策 - 拥有企业。

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