A Zero-Sum Game Theoretic Approach for Mitigating Counterfeit Integrated Circuits in Supply Chain

摘要

Counterfeiting of integrated circuits (ICs) is a rising issue with a huge economic impact on the electronics industry. With the electronic component supply chain growing more complex due to globalization, and parts coming from a diverse set of suppliers, counterfeit electronics have become a major challenge. Given the critical engineering applications that use ICs consistently, such a growth in the supply chain's complexity has led to serious security threats due to potential insertion of noncompliant hardware components.In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework to analyze the interactions between a hardware supplier (attacker), and the IC component testing site of a company (defender). We formulate the problem as a non-cooperative zero-sum game in which the attacker decides on the type of counterfeit component to insert into the chain while running the risk of detection and its collateral damages. Meanwhile, the defender, seeking an optimum utility payoff while contending with limited resources, must decide on the best testing and detection strategy. Simulation results assess the performance of the proposed game-theoretic framework and provide further insights into the effectiveness of our solution.