首页> 外文会议>Annual meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management >New Thoughts on Protecting Nuclear Materials and Facilities: A Systems-Theoretic Framework for Security
【24h】

New Thoughts on Protecting Nuclear Materials and Facilities: A Systems-Theoretic Framework for Security

机译:保护核材料和核设施的新思想:系统理论安全框架

获取原文

摘要

Current approaches to nuclear security are best described by the International Atomic Energy Agency's guidance to develop 'risk-based physical protection systems and measures' intended to deter, detect, delay, respond and (if necessary) mitigate malicious acts regarding nuclear materials. These approaches can produce elegantly designed physical protections systems that may be limited by untenable assumptions (for mathematical tractability) or well stated descriptions of desired behaviors that rely on vague, imprecise notions of security-improving characteristics. More to the point, noted nuclear security culture expert Dr. Igor Khripunov noted a lack of guidance on "assessing the human factor in detection, delay and response." But no one has yet figured out a way to understand specifically how organizational and human factors might influence PPS effectiveness. This conference paper summarizes recent research exploring and developing a framework that evaluates system-level interactions between the technical nuclear security systems and human/organizational behaviors to determine overall security performance. Technical systems encompasses both the PPS and physical infrastructure on which it sits and is described by the traditional system effectiveness measure. Similarly, human/ organizational behaviors include formal (e.g., official roles and responsibilities) and informal aspects (e.g., networks of information flow and internal power dynamics) that are manifested in security procedures and concepts of operations (CONOPs). The Systems-Theoretic Framework for Security (STFS) uses security task completion to explain how human behavior is required to enact the technical system--and the technical system is necessary to guide human behavior--to achieve desired levels of security performance. This interaction is based on the logic that the adequate completion of security tasks, defined as performance specifications based on the PPS design, is required to achieve desired levels of security performance. STFS, then, argues that desired security performance is achieved when the PPS, human/organizational behaviors and their interactions support the validity of such performance requirements to enable adequate security task completion. Further, STFS aids in identifying where organizational influences on security task completion may be varying enough from what the technical system designers expected to undermine the assumptions on which they based their estimates of system performance.
机译:国际原子能机构关于开发“基于风险的实物保护系统和措施”的指南,最好地描述了当前的核安全方法,旨在制止,检测,延迟,响应和(必要时)减轻与核材料有关的恶意行为。这些方法可以产生设计精美的物理保护系统,该系统可能受不可靠的假设(对于数学易处理性)或对依赖于模糊不精确的安全改进特性概念的预期行为的明确说明的限制。更重要的是,核安全文化专家伊戈尔·赫里普诺夫(Igor Khripunov)博士指出,缺乏有关“评估探测,延误和响应中的人为因素”的指导。但是,还没有人找到一种方法来专门了解组织和人为因素如何影响PPS的有效性。本会议论文总结了最近的研究,该研究探索和开发了一个框架,该框架评估技术核保安系统与人类/组织行为之间的系统级交互,以确定总体保安性能。技术系统既包含PPS,也包含其所在的物理基础结构,并通过传统的系统有效性度量进行描述。同样,人类/组织的行为包括正式形式(例如,官方角色和职责)和非正式方面(例如,信息流网络和内部权力动态),这些都体现在安全程序和操作概念(CONOP)中。系统安全理论框架(STFS)使用安全任务完成来解释如何要求人类行为来制定技术系统-并且该技术系统对于指导人类行为是必不可少的-以达到期望的安全性能水平。这种交互基于这样的逻辑,即要获得所需的安全性能水平,必须充分完成安全任务(定义为基于PPS设计的性能规格)。因此,STFS认为,当PPS,人员/组织行为及其交互支持此类性能要求的有效性以实现足够的安全任务时,便可以实现所需的安全性能。此外,STFS有助于确定组织对安全任务完成的影响在哪些方面可能与技术系统设计人员期望破坏其基于系统性能的估计所基于的假设有所不同。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号