This paper provides a programmatic overview of a conception of iconic logic from a Wittgensteinian point of view (WIL for short). The crucial differences between WIL and a standard version of symbolic logic (SSL) are identified and discussed. WIL differs from other versions of logic in that in WIL, logical forms are identified by means of so-called ideal diagrams. A logical proof consists of an equivalence transformation of formulas into ideal diagrams, from which logical forms can be read off directly. Logical forms specify properties that identify sets of models (conditions of truth) and sets of counter-models (conditions of falsehood). In this way, WIL allows the sets of models and counter-models to be described by finite means. Against this background, the question of the decidability of first-order-logic (FOL) is revisited. In the last section, WIL is contrasted with Peirce's iconic logic (PIL).
展开▼
