Improved Calculation of aS Resilience against IP Prefix Hijacking

摘要

Network prefix hijacking is still a serious threat in the Internet. Confirmed incidents in the recent past have shown that even small autonomous systems (ASs) are able to manipulate routing information with huge global impact. Even though countermeasures exist, they are not established at large scale yet. Monitoring of the actual routing state is the only mean to provide at least information about prefix hijacking events for single ASs. Given topology information the resilience of an AS against prefix hijacking attacks can be determined. This paper proposes an improved formula to calculate the resilience of an AS against prefix hijacking. Additionally, the role of internet exchange points (IXPs) and the peering opportunities they provide are evaluated. Such opportunities allow for establishing links between ASs at very low cost. Current peering opportunities are derived from a collection of member data gathered from European IXPs. Furthermore, the effect of additional links on an AS's resilience is investigated by combining actual peering and individual peering opportunities.