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The Power of Simplification: Operator Interface With the AP1000~? During Design-Basis And Beyond Design-Basis Events

机译:简化的力量:与AP1000的操作员界面〜?在设计基础上和超越设计基础事件

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The AP1000~R plant is an 1100-MWe pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance, safety and cost. The passive safety features are designed to function without safety-grade support systems such as component cooling water, service water, compressed air or HVAC. The AP1000 passive safety features achieve and maintain safe shutdown in case of a design-basis accident for 72 hours without need for operator action, meeting the expectations provided in the European Utility Requirements and the Utility Requirement Document for passive plants. Limited operator actions may be required to maintain safe conditions in the spent fuel pool (SFP) via passive means. This safety approach therefore minimizes the reliance on operator action for accident mitigation, and this paper examines the operator interaction with the Human-System Interface (HSI) as the severity of an accident increases from an anticipated transient to a design basis accident and finally, to a beyond-design-basis event. The AP1000 Control Room design provides an extremely effective environment for addressing the first 72 hours of design-basis events and transients, providing ease of information dissemination and minimal reliance upon operator actions. Symptom-based procedures including Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs) and Alarm Response Procedures (ARPs) are used to mitigate design basis transients and accidents. Use of the Computerized Procedure System (CPS) aids the operators during mitigation of the event. The CPS provides cues and direction to the operators as the event progresses. If the event becomes progressively worse or lasts longer than 72 hours, and depending upon the nature of failures that may have occurred, minimal operator actions may be required outside of the control room in areas that have been designed to be accessible using components that have been designed to be reliable in these conditions. The primary goal of any such actions is to maintain or refill the passive inventory available to cool the core, containment and spent fuel pool in the safety-related and seismically qualified Passive Containment Cooling Water Storage Tank (PCCWST). The seismically-qualified, ground-mounted Passive Containment Cooling Ancillary Water Storage Tank (PCCAWST) is also available for this function as appropriate. The primary effect of these actions would be to increase the coping time for the AP1000 during design basis events, as well as events such as those described above, from 72 hours without operator intervention to 7 days with minimal operator actions. These Operator actions necessary to protect the health and safety of the public are addressed in the Post-72 Hour procedures, as well as some EOPs, AOPs, ARPs and the Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs). Should the event continue to become more severe and plant conditions degrade further with indications of inadequate core cooling, the SAMGs provide guidance for strategies to address these hypothetical severe accident conditions. The AP1000 SAMG diagnoses and actions are prioritized to first utilize the API000 features that are expected to retain a damaged core inside the reactor vessel. Only one strategy is undertaken at any time. This strategy will be followed and its effectiveness evaluated before other strategies are undertaken. This is a key feature of both the symptom-oriented AP1000 EOPs and the AP1000 SAMGs which maximizes the probability of retaining a damaged core inside the reactor vessel and containment while minimizing the chances for confusion and human errors during implementation. The AP1000 SAMGs are simple and straight-forward and have been developed with considerable input from human factors and plant operations experts. Most importantly, and different from severe accident management strategies for other plants, the AP1000 SAMGs do not require diagnosis of
机译:在AP1000〜ř植物为1100兆瓦压水堆与被动安全特性和广泛的植物简化增强构造,操作,维护,安全性和成本。被动安全功能旨在功能而不安全级支持系统,例如部件的冷却水,服务水,压缩空气或HVAC。 AP1000的非能动安全特性达到并保持在72小时而无需操作员操作设计基准事故的情况下安全停堆,满足欧洲电力公司要求和无源设备的实用性要求提供文件的预期。有限的操作员的操作可能会被要求保持在通过被动方式向乏燃料池(SFP)的安全条件。因此,这种安全方法最大限度地减少对缓解事故的操作员操作的依赖,本文考察与人力系统接口(HSI)作为从预期瞬态事故上升到设计基准事故的严重性运营商的互动,最后,以一种超越,设计基准事件。 AP1000的控制室设计提供了一种用于解决第一个72小时设计基准事件和瞬变,当操作员操作提供方便的信息传播和最小的依赖的极其有效环境。基于症状的程序,包括应急操作程序(EOP的),异常操作程序(高级氧化)和报警响应程序(的ARP)来减轻设计基准瞬变和事故。计算机化过程系统(CPS)的使用情况的缓解过程中帮助运营商。的CPS提供了线索和方向给运营商作为事件进展。如果事件逐步恶化成为或持续时间超过72小时,并根据可能发生的故障的性质,最小的操作员的操作可能需要在已设计为可访问使用组件已地区控制室之外设计为在这些条件下可靠。任何此类行动的主要目标是维持或补充现有的被动库存来冷却堆芯,遏制和乏燃料池的安全相关的和合格的地震能动安全壳冷却水储存箱(PCCWST)。该地震合格,地面安装被动容器冷却辅助储水罐(PCCAWST)也可用此功能为合适。这些动作的主要作用是增加在设计基准事件,以及事件,如上述的那些,从72小时无操作员干预至7天以最小的操作员的操作为AP1000的应对时间。这些必要保护公众的健康和安全在后72小时程序解决操作员操作,以及一些EOP的,高级氧化,ARP及严重事故管理指南(SAMGs)。如果事件继续变得更严重,设备条件与核不足的迹象冷却进一步降低,在SAMGs提供战略,以解决这些假想严重事故条件的指导。在AP1000 SAMG诊断和动作优先级以第一利用被预期保留在反应堆容器的内部损坏的芯的API000的功能。只有一个策略是在任何时候进行。这一战略将遵循并采取其他策略之前,它的有效性进行评估。这是面向症状AP1000 EOP的和AP1000 SAMGs最大化保持在反应器容器和安全壳内损坏的芯,同时在实施过程中最大程度地减少混乱和人为错误的可能性的概率两者的关键特征。该AP1000 SAMGs是简单而直接的,并已开发了人为因素和工厂运营专家相当大的投入。最重要的是,和其他植物的严重事故管理策略不同,AP1000的SAMGs不需要的诊断

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