SUPPLY-SIDE CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE FOUNDER/CEO IN BRIBERY DECISIONS

摘要

We wondered how corruption, an endemic phenomenon in Nigeria is experienced there by one specific and understudied set of actors - entrepreneurs - and, specifically, how they understand and respond to bribes demanded by government agents. To our surprise, we found entrepreneurs themselves are active perpetrators of bribery, not victims of bribe-demanding government agents. Their willful bribe-generating behavior, supported by a myriad of actors including government agents, politicians and technocrats, is governed by a well-embedded set of social norms, rules, routines and power relations. Vivid narratives of successful entrepreneurs, both indigenous and diasporic, demonstrate how they deliberately and skillfully create a demand for corruption, subverting formal state budgetary systems and substituting informal "bribery best practices" to capture private gains. Our data revealed that bribery is produced through a complex and recursive interplay between skilled agents and state allocative systems, changing the social order for resource allocation among competing firms.