Targeted Discreditation Attack against Trust Management in Connected Vehicles

摘要

Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication systems in the U.S. rely on IEEE 1609.2 security protocols for message authentication using digital signatures. A key requirement for trust management in such systems is the ability to detect misbehaving vehicles, e.g., when vehicles are repeatedly forging signatures. However, this creates a new attack surface where receivers cannot determine whether the causes of signature verification failures are indeed malicious attacks. In this paper, we present our novel, open-source, USRP-based testbed and utilize it to demonstrate how a stealthy reactive jammer can exploit this vulnerability. Our novel, targeted attack is highly efficient (even given the short validity period for vehicle pseudonyms) and difficult to detect. Our experimental results show that our attack can successfully discredit a victim in prominent misbehavior detection schemes with just two minutes of jamming. Finally, we discuss the capabilities and extensibility of our testbed as well as the challenges of potential attack mitigation techniques.