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Performing Risk-InformedDefense-in-Depth and Diversity Assessmentsfor Digital Upgrades in Nuclear Plants

机译:为核电厂的数字升级执行风险通报的深度防御和多样性评估

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Most of the replacements and upgrades of aging and obsolete instrumentation and controlrnsystems involve transitions from analog to digital technology. The current regulatory guidancernrequires that a defense-in-depth and diversity evaluation be performed for digital upgrades tornsafety systems. This largely deterministic approach sometimes results in significant utility andrnNuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) resources spent on events, components, and backuprnsystems that do not 1) contribute significantly to plant risk, 2) address other events that may bernsignificant contributors, or 3) improve plant safety. EPRI has recently published a guideline tornassist utilities in performing such evaluations and has submitted it to the Nuclear RegulatoryrnCommission for review and endorsement. Three methods are proposed. The ExtendedDeterministic method is based on the approach outlined in the current regulatory guidance, but itrnalso considers designed-in “defensive measures” and use of risk insights when assessingrnsusceptibilities to common-cause failure. It addresses potentially risk-significant events that mayrnbe overlooked by the current approach. The Standard Risk-Informed method and the SimplifiedrnRisk-Informed method both take into account risk insights provided by the plant-specificrnprobabilistic risk assessment. The EPRI approach examines three factors that determine thernimpact of a digital I&C upgrade on plant risk: a) Impact of the upgrade on I&C channelrnreliability; b) Potential for digital common-cause failure introduced by the upgrade; and c) Therndesign of the plant and the plant mitigating systems available to respond to specific eventsrnaffected by the upgrade (sometimes called the plant safety model). It is the combined effects ofrnthese factors that determine impact on plant risk. This paper describes the EPRI approach forrnassessing defense-in-depth and diversity in the context of the three important risk factors.
机译:老化和过时的仪器和控制系统的大多数替换和升级都涉及从模拟技术到数字技术的过渡。当前的法规指南要求对数字升级防盗系统进行深度防御和多样性评估。这种很大程度上是确定性的方法有时会导致巨大的效用和核监管委员会(NRC)在事件,组件和备用系统上花费的资源,这些资源不会1)对工厂风险有重大贡献,2)解决可能对重要贡献者影响不大的其他事件,或3)改善工厂安全。 EPRI最近发布了执行此类评估的准则,要求将其提交给核监管委员会进行审核和认可。提出了三种方法。扩展确定性方法基于当前监管指南中概述的方法,但是在评估对常见原因失败的敏感性时,它还考虑了内置的“防御措施”和风险洞察力的使用。它解决了当前方法可能忽略的潜在风险重大事件。标准风险通报方法和简化风险通报方法都考虑了特定于工厂的概率风险评估提供的风险见解。 EPRI方法检查了确定数字I&C升级对工厂风险的影响的三个因素:a)升级对I&C通道可靠性的影响; b)升级带来的数字公共原因故障的可能性; c)工厂的设计和工厂缓解系统,用于响应受升级影响的特定事件(有时称为工厂安全模型)。这些因素的综合影响决定了对工厂风险的影响。本文介绍了在三个重要风险因素的背景下评估深度防御和多样性的EPRI方法。

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