Detecting Adversarial Attacks in the Context of Bayesian Networks

摘要

In this research, we study data poisoning attacks against Bayesian network structure learning algorithms. We propose to use the distance between Bayesian network models and the value of data conflict to detect data poisoning attacks. We propose a 2-layered framework that detects both one-step and long-duration data poisoning attacks. Layer 1 enforces 'reject on negative impacts' detection; i.e., input that changes the Bayesian network model is labeled potentially malicious. Layer 2 aims to detect long-duration attacks; i.e., observations in the incoming data that conflict with the original Bayesian model. We show that for a typical small Bayesian network, only a few contaminated cases are needed to corrupt the learned structure. Our detection methods are effective against not only one-step attacks but also sophisticated long-duration attacks. We also present our empirical results.