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The Central Government, China Banking Regulatory Commission, and Rural Bank:Based on the Analysis of Double Principal-Agent Relationship

机译:中央政府,中国银行业监督管理委员会和农村银行:基于双重委托-代理关系的分析

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摘要

There is a double principal-agent relationship in the process of construction of rural bank,i.e.,the principal-agent relationship among the central government,China Banking Regulatory Commission and rural bank.The paper begins from the principal-agent relationship of the central government,the China Banking Regulatory Commission,and rural bank.First,using the theory of game and principal-agent,we construct two layers of principal-agent model; second,we analysis how to set up effective governance mechanism through the method of quantity analysis in each layer of the agent relation; finally,we can the conclusions of the paper according to the model results.
机译:在农村银行建设过程中,存在双重委托代理关系,即中央政府,中国银行业监督管理委员会和农村银行之间的委托代理关系。本文从中央政府的委托代理关系入手。首先,运用博弈论和委托代理理论,构建了两层委托代理模型。其次,我们通过数量分析的方法分析了代理关系各层的有效治理机制。最后,根据模型结果可以得出本文的结论。

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