The shipbroker's evaluation behavior study about the financing of the small and medium shipping enterprises

摘要

When the small- and medium-sized shipping enterprises mortgages ships from the bank, the ship is assessed by a shipbroker. Moral hazard derives from asymmetric information between the bank and the broker, that is, the broker may collude with the shipping enterprise to over evaluate the ship in order to gain extra payoff. While a small and medium size shipping enterprise applies for ship mortgages from a bank, the bank may outsource the ship evaluation to a third party, during which moral hazard derives from asymmetric information between the bank and the broker, which is mostly the shipbroker. This article briefly analyses the one-off game between the bank and the shipbroker without bank's adequate constraints, and shows that over-evaluation occurs while the broker intends to maximize its benefit. Then, in the two-period game analysis, the broker's reputation is introduced and the bank can regulate the broker's behavior through further rewards and penalties. In a sense, the reputation effect reduces the tacit collusion and bank's risk in ship financing.